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Uncertainty about the level of demand is thought to influence irreversible capacity decisions. 
This paper examines some implications of the theory literature on this topic in an empirical 
study of the US cement industry between 1994 and 2006. Firms in this sector have the ability 
to deliver cement either from domestic plants or from imports. Since cement is costly to 
transport via land, the difference in marginal cost between local production and imports varies 
across local markets. The marginal cost of imports is lower in areas with access to a sea port, 
decreasing the relative value of investing in local capacity sufficient to supply positive local 
demand shocks. In the presence of uncertain demand, firms may choose to serve these 
markets via both domestic production and imports. Consistent with the theory, we find a 
negative relationship between the average level of excess capacity and demand volatility only 
for coastal areas. An increase in demand volatility is associated with an increase in excess 
capacity only in landlocked areas. More generally, the paper shows that the cost of imports 
relative to the cost of domestic production affects the relationship between uncertainty and 
domestic capacity decisions. The results suggest that a unilateral climate policy in the US may 
induce a partial international relocation of capacity in carbon intensive industries, such as 
cement, by increasing the relative cost of domestic production. 
JEL-Code: D24, D81, F18, L61. 
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access  to  imports  help  explain  variation  in  the  relationship  between  local  demand 
uncertainty and the domestic capacity decisions made by cement producers in the US? 
 

















capacity  is  controlled  by  the  large  multinational  firms  that  dominate  this  industry 


























production  and  imports,  respectively,  in  our  model)  will  co‐exist  under  some 
circumstances. Much of the prior existing theory on FDI offers only limited explanation 
of  this  empirical regularity,  as  noted  by  Blonigen  (2001)  and  Head  and  Ries  (2001). 
However, Rob and Vettas focus on the optimal strategy mix between FDI and exports as 












































investment  in  the  chemical  processing  industry.  Most  micro‐level  empirical  work  is 
based on variation in the option value of delaying investment, dynamics and adjustment 
processes. Our approach is closer to the original perspective taken in Rothschild and 






























once  built,  the  capacity  of  a  given  plant  cannot  be  increased  without  large  re‐
investment. In addition, markets are horizontally differentiated. Quality‐wise cement is 
a  homogenous  good,  but  a  high  transportation  cost  relative  to  the  production  cost 
creates strong spatial differentiation. 
 
Local  demand  tends  to  be  quite  volatile,  generating  significant  regional  differences 
between supply and demand. These differences need to be balanced with inter‐regional 
flows, some from adjacent regions, others, in particular if the region is on the coast, 
through  long  haul  flows.




















Their  short  term  optimization  depends  on  their  available  capacities  in  the  various 


































District Name Landlocked  Indicator 
Alabama  1 
Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington  0 
Arizona, New Mexico  1 
Arkansas, Oklahoma  1 
California, Northern  0 
California, Southern  0 
Colorado, Wyoming  1 
Florida  0 
Georgia, Virginia, West Virginia, South Carolina, Maryland  0 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah  1 
Illinois  1 
Indiana  1 
Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota  1 
Kansas  1 
Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee  1 
Michigan, Wisconsin  1 
Missouri  1 
New York, Maine  0 
Ohio  1 
Pennsylvania, Eastern  0 
Pennsylvania, Western  1 
Texas, Northern  1 
Texas, Southern  0 
























































































































































































routine  maintenance.  Production,  also  in  thousand  metric  tons,  includes  cement 
produced using imported clinker. The USGS Minerals Yearbook also includes data on the 
number of active plants by district – which allows us to measure average plant size in 









These  aggregate  measures  mask  substantial  variation  across  districts.  The  standard 
deviation  of  the  percentage  change  in  capacity  is  29%.  Three  districts  –  Ohio,  and 
Eastern and Western Pennsylvania – saw declines in capacity. Northern Texas and the 
district containing Georgia, Virginia, West Virginia, South Carolina, and Maryland saw 
the  largest  absolute  increases  in  capacity.  The  percentage  increases  were  largest  in 




























To  measure  demand  uncertainty  for  each  district,  we  construct  a  measure  of  the 






























As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  our  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  the  model 
developed by Ponssard and Meunier (2009). The model features a local oligopoly that 




































                                                 
12 This explains why in the model firms do not export from their domestic production capacity. As for 







































Qualitatively,  the  optimal  capacity  is  increasing  as  the  cost  of  imports  increases; 
eventually,  as  one  may  expect,  it  does  not  depend  on  this  cost.  The  influence  of 
volatility depends on whether the cost of imports is high or low (to be precise, greater 
or lower than 2ck +ch). If it is high (along the “landlocked” vertical line), the optimal 



























1  [a-ch-ck]/2b  Independent of cf   
Independent of  
2  [a-ch+-(2ck)
1/2)]/2b  Independent of cf   






Increasing in if cf > 2ck +ch 
Decreasing in if cf < 2ck +ch 
4  [a-cf -2b +[cf -ck-ch)]
































































Zones 1 and 2   = ck 
Zones 2 and 3   = cf -ch)
2/4 ck 
Zones 3 and 4   = cf -ch)
2/4(cf -ch -ck) 
Zones 4 and 1   = cf -(ch +ck) 
 
Consider  now  the  case  of  N  firms,  with  N>1.  Denote  k*(N;)  the  optimal  capacity 
decision  as  a  function  of  N  and    Meunier  and  Ponssard  prove  that,  at  the  Nash 





















   
Landlocked  0.20 0.15 
 (0.06)  (0.08) 
   
   
Coastal  0.20 0.10 
 (0.05)  (0.10) 
   
 
As  noted  in  the  preceding  section,  it  is  likely  that  the  phenomenon  under  study 





over  time,  it  makes  more  sense  to  increase  average  plant  capacity  in  a  landlocked 
district than in a coastal one. In a similar way, since we expect that dry kilns are more 























Excess Capacity                         
((Capacity-Production)/Capacity) 
   Percentage Change 1994-2006 
   Low Volatility  High Volatility 
      
Landlocked  9.23 42.41 
 (47.57)  (109.31) 
       
       
Coastal  29.08 -18.38 
   (60.36)  (94.46) 
      
      
   Average Plant Size ('000 metric tons) 
   Percentage Change 1994-2006 
   Low Volatility  High Volatility 
      
Landlocked  28.62 56.65 
 (15.86)  (30.98) 
       
       
Coastal  18.77 17.59 
   (21.37)  (16.21) 
      
      
   % Dry Process    
   Percentage Point Change 1994-2006 
   Low Volatility  High Volatility 
      
Landlocked  13% 29% 
 (23%)  (21%) 
       
       
Coastal  45% -3% 
   (66%)  (5%) 
    
 
In panel B of Table 6, the tests of significance of the relevant linear combinations of 













level  less  the  mean  production  level  in  the  district  over  time  divided  by  the  yearly 
capacity level. We use the mean production by district over the time period 1994‐2006 




























  16We  test  whether  differences  in  the  estimated  coefficients  are  significantly  different 
from zero, and significantly different from each other, in ways that are consistent with 













the  results.  The  second  specification  we  estimate  includes  district  fixed  effects  in 
equation (1), and hence omits non‐time varying district characteristics. This specification 
tells us whether changes in demand growth or volatility within a district are associated 
























































the  interaction  of  demand  volatility  and  the  variable  indicating  that  a  district  is 










































































the  effectiveness  of  unilateral  policies  in  sectors  that  are  subject  to  international 











existing  empirical  work  cannot  yet  capture  long  run  effects.  This  paper  provides  an 
important indirect contribution. It substantiates that there are indeed long term effects 
on investment levels associated with a change in the relative costs of imports when 























































investment:  Theory  and  empirical  evidence.”  Journal  of Applied  Econometrics. 9(S1): 
S95‐S112. 
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 Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A
District 




(or Wet and 




(or Wet and 
Dry)*
000 metric tons # 000 metric tons 000 metric tons % 000 metric tons # 000 metric tons 000 metric tons %
1 Alabama 1432 5 4573 914.6 100% 1798 5 6036 1207.2 100%
2 Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington 3168 4 2295 573.8 75% 4307 4 2540 635.0 67%
3 Arizona, New Mexico 2823 3 2288 762.7 100% 5511 3 3310 1103.3 100%
4 Arkansas, Oklahoma 1994 4 2694 673.5 50% 2730 4 3260 815.0 50%
5 California, Northern 2872 3 2776 925.3 100% 4761 3 2853 951.0 100%
6 California, Southern 5328 8 7933 991.6 100% 9549 8 10238 1279.8 100%
7 Colorado, Wyoming 2021 4 2377 594.3 75% 3107 3 3450 1150.0 100%
8 Florida 5623 6 4382 730.3 50% 11180 7 7301 1043.0 100%
9 Georgia, Virginia, West Virginia, South Carolina, Maryland 9461 11 8586 780.5 60% 14716 10 11636 1163.6 78%
10 Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah 3112 6 2422 403.7 33% 5443 6 3750 625.0 50%
11 Illinois 3593 4 3217 804.3 100% 4555 4 3420 855.0 100%
12 Indiana 1876 4 2867 716.8 50% 2173 4 3720 930.0 75%
13 Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota 3112 6 5758 959.7 100% 4182 5 6048 1209.6 100%
14 Kansas 1277 4 1801 450.3 50% 1546 4 3329 832.3 75%
15 Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee 3794 4 2128 532.0 50% 4765 4 3700 925.0 75%
16 Michigan, Wisconsin 5992 5 6532 1306.4 67% 6578 5 7328 1465.6 67%
17 Missouri 2386 5 5059 1011.8 60% 2626 5 6958 1391.6 60%
18 New York, Maine 3691 5 4141 828.2 20% 5207 5 4203 840.6 50%
19 Ohio 3482 3 1588 529.3 50% 3727 2 1304 652.0 50%
20 Pennsylvania, Eastern 1967 8 4878 609.8 71% 2172 7 4530 647.1 67%
21 Pennsylvania, Western 2529 4 2009 502.3 25% 3030 3 1770 590.0 33%
22 Texas, Northern 3817 6 4512 752.0 50% 6499 6 7594 1265.7 67%


















1 Alabama 1 0 0 0.020 0.024
2 Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington 0 0 0 0.020 0.012
3 Arizona, New Mexico 1 1 0 0.059 0.024
4 Arkansas, Oklahoma 1 0 1 0.031 0.037
5 California, Northern 0 1 0 0.053 0.027
6 California, Southern 0 1 1 0.064 0.032
7 Colorado, Wyoming 1 1 1 0.043 0.041
8 Florida 0 1 0 0.061 0.023
9 Georgia, Virginia, West Virginia, South Carolina, Maryland 0 1 0 0.033 0.021
10 Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah 1 1 0 0.037 0.025
11 Illinois 1 0 0 0.021 0.028
12 Indiana 1 0 0 0.014 0.028
13 Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota 1 0 0 0.026 0.016
14 Kansas 1 0 1 0.011 0.030
15 Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee 1 0 1 0.013 0.032
16 Michigan, Wisconsin 1 0 0 0.014 0.026
17 Missouri 1 0 1 0.018 0.030
18 New York, Maine 0 0 0 0.029 0.026
19 Ohio 1 0 0 0.008 0.025
20 Pennsylvania, Eastern 0 0 1 0.016 0.044
21 Pennsylvania, Western 1 0 1 0.023 0.042
22 Texas, Northern 1 1 1 0.054 0.046
23 Texas, Southern 0 1 0 0.048 0.028
* We take the number of plants from Table 3 of the USGS Minerals Survey in each year. The percentage dry technology is taken from Table 5, which is based on the number of white cement plants. 
The total number of white cement plants is on occasion less than the total number of plants. This means the percentage dry technology does not reflect a percentage of the total number of plants.
1994 2006
1994-2006Table 2: Pairwise Correlations in 1998 and 2006
(Earliest year is 1998 since demand growth and volatility are first measured for this year, based on data from 1994-1998)
1998 Demand Number of Plants Capacity Production Average Plant Size
Percentage Dry (or 
Wet and Dry) 
Process Demand Growth Demand Volatility
Demand 1
Number of Plants 0.59 1
Capacity 0.67 0.81 1
Production 0.62 0.79 0.98 1
Average Plant Size 0.37 0.09 0.65 0.62 1
Percentage Dry (or Wet and Dry) Process 0.02 0.05 0.26 0.30 0.40 1
Demand Growth 0.37 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.14 0.34 1
Demand Volatility -0.24 -0.01 -0.15 -0.04 -0.27 -0.28 -0.10 1
2006 Demand Number of Plants Capacity Production Average Plant Size
Percentage Dry (or 
Wet and Dry) 
Process Demand Growth Demand Volatility
Demand 1
Number of Plants 0.71 1
Capacity 0.71 0.87 1
Production 0.67 0.89 0.99 1
Average Plant Size 0.31 0.32 0.71 0.68 1
Percentage Dry (or Wet and Dry) Process 0.29 0.15 0.31 0.33 0.47 1
Demand Growth 0.56 0.31 0.36 0.38 0.30 0.48 1
Demand Volatility -0.25 -0.05 -0.09 0.00 -0.06 -0.26 0.10 1Table 5: Capacity-related Variables by District Group, 1994, 2006, and 1994-2006
(Standard Deviations, across districts in each group, in parentheses)
Excess Capacity ((Capacity-Production)/Capacity)
Low Volatility High Volatility Low Volatility High Volatility Low Volatility High Volatility
Landlocked 0.20 0.13 0.20 0.15 9.23 42.41
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (47.57) (109.31)
Coastal 0.19 0.15 0.20 0.10 29.08 -18.38
(0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (60.36) (94.46)
Average Plant Size ('000 metric tons)
Low Volatility High Volatility Low Volatility High Volatility Low Volatility High Volatility
Landlocked 800 645 1006 996 28.62 56.65
(276) (191) (293) (284) (15.86) (30.98)
Coastal 793 801 935 963 18.77 17.59
(132) (270) (181) (447) (21.37) (16.21)
% Dry Process 
Low Volatility High Volatility Low Volatility High Volatility Low Volatility High Volatility
Landlocked 75% 51% 80% 66% 13% 29%
(28%) (15%) (23%) (21%) (23%) (21%)
Coastal 68% 86% 82% 83% 45% -3%




Percentage Point Change 1994-2006
1994 2006
1994 2006Table 6:  Excess capacity, in high and low volatility districts, landlocked and coastal. 1994 and 2006.*
Panel A: Regression Output
COEFFICIENT Excess Capacity Excess Capacity
1994 2006
High Demand Growth Indicator -0.08** 0.09
[0.04] [0.07]
High Demand Volatility Indicator -0.11*** -0.13*
[0.03] [0.07]
Landlocked * High Demand Growth -0.03 -0.01
[0.09] [0.08]








Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
*Excess capacity is measured as (Capacity-Production)/Capacity for year district in each year.








Low volatility 0 -0.06 No Low volatility 0 0.03 No
[0.06] [0.04]
High volatility -0.11*** -0.19** No High volatility -0.13* 0.04 No
[0.03] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06]
Significant difference across rows? Yes*** No Significant difference across rows? Yes* NoTable 7: Cross Section. Excess Capacity.*
Panel A: Regression Output
1234
VARIABLES Excess Capacity Excess Capacity Excess Capacity Excess Capacity
Demand Growth 0.10 0.10 -0.03 -0.03
[0.30] [0.58] [0.49] [0.79]
Demand Volatility -0.64 -0.64 -2.89*** -2.89***
[0.57] [0.83] [0.88] [0.83]
Landlocked * Demand Growth 0.13 0.13
[0.51] [0.87]




Constant 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.34*** 0.34***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Year Fixed Effects YYYY
Standard Errors Unclustered Bootstrapped Unclustered Bootstrapped
Observations 207 207 207 207
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.22
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
*The dependent variable is yearly capacity less the mean production level for the district divided by the yearly capacity level.
Any changes over time within a district hence reflect changes in capacity.




5th percentile volatility -0.03*** -0.10** No
[0.01] [0.04]
95th percentile volatility -0.16*** -0.07 Yes**
[0.05] [0.04]
Significant difference across rows? Yes*** No
From column 4Table 8: Panel, Excess Capacity.*
Panel A: Regression Output
1234
VARIABLES Excess Capacity Excess Capacity Excess Capacity Excess Capacity
Demand Growth 0.318 0.318 0.049 0.049
[0.301] [0.504] [0.282] [0.476]
Demand Volatility 1.449** 1.449 -0.808 -0.808
[0.685] [1.079] [0.569] [0.877]
Landlocked * Demand Growth 0.445 0.445
[0.413] [0.745]
Landlocked * Demand Volatility 3.470*** 3.470**
[1.000] [1.469]
Constant 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.199*** 0.199***
[0.036] [0.049] [0.035] [0.045]
Year Fixed Effects YYYY
District Fixed Effects YYYY
Standard Errors Unclustered Bootstrapped Unclustered Bootstrapped
Observations 207 207 207 207
R-squared 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.57
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets
*The dependent variable is yearly capacity less the mean production level for the district divided by the yearly capacity level.
Any changes over time within a district hence reflect changes in capacity.





Demand Volatility -0.02 0.08** Yes**
[0.03] [0.04]
From column 4Table 9: Panel, Average Plant Size and Percentage Dry Process (Measures of Capacity Quality)























Demand Growth 196.028 196.028 55.385 55.385 -0.033 -0.033 0.782* 0.782
[347.952] [630.986] [371.767] [540.451] [0.282] [0.502] [0.427] [0.754]
Demand Volatility 1,637.829** 1,637.829 -889.933 -889.933 0.930* 0.930 1.851** 1.851
[770.560] [1,166.945] [799.889] [1,147.029] [0.521] [0.654] [0.800] [1.626]
Landlocked * Demand Growth 241.497 241.497 -1.304*** -1.304**
[503.527] [911.521] [0.443] [0.658]
Landlocked * Demand Volatility 3,875.910*** 3,875.910** -1.465 -1.465
[1,250.521] [1,742.301] [1.064] [1.897]
Constant 923.941*** 923.941*** 930.292*** 930.292*** 0.739*** 0.739*** 0.732*** 0.732***
[37.320] [57.848] [37.268] [57.629] [0.024] [0.046] [0.024] [0.053]
Year Fixed Effects YYYYYYYY
District Fixed Effects YYYYYYYY
Standard Errors Unclustered Bootstrapped Unclustered Bootstrapped Unclustered Bootstrapped Unclustered Bootstrapped
Observations 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207
R-squared 0.870 0.870 0.876 0.876 0.898 0.898 0.902 0.902
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets










Demand Volatility -25.80 86.55*** Yes** 0.05 0.1 No
[34.12] [36.33] [0.05] [0.2]
From column 4. Average Plant Size. From column 8. Percentage Dry Process.CESifo Working Paper Series 
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